We analyze the profitability of banks' lending to their owners, based on a sample of banks owned by Austrian municipalities. We find evidence in support of a looting explanation for related lending. The evidence for looting is significant, however, only for banks that are owned by municipalities in which there is a high level of competition between political parties. For those municipalities in which the incumbent party faces a high reelection probability we find no such evidence.
Introduction
Banks often lend money to related parties such as shareholders and directors. This related lending has the potential to ameliorate inefficiencies (e.g., because other banks know less about the borrowers), but it may also be used to divert resources from other investors and depositors (or from taxpayers who insure deposits). That is, related parties may take advantage of their influence to "loot" their banks through related lending.
Two important earlier works have provided evidence of looting in related lending. Laeven (2001) examines bank lending policies in Russia in the early 1990s. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) examine bank lending policies in Mexico in the mid-1990s. Both of these papers focus on loans to nonfinancial firms where either the firms are bank shareholders, or there exist bank shareholders who also hold shares in the nonfinancial firms. Both papers find evidence that related lending results in looting. This looting can take the form of lower interest rates and/or larger, but lower quality, loans.
The present study contributes to our understanding of related lending by looking at such lending in a very different context. As in the above studies we focus on lending that may benefit a controlling stakeholder of a bank. In our study, however, we look at banks that are owned by municipal governments and that make loans to these governments. The controlling stakeholders are public officeholders (town mayors) who also serve as bank directors.
We begin our study with a discussion of the incentives that can lead a politician to ask a government-owned bank to engage in government financing at terms that are not beneficial to the bank. At first sight, such a transaction appears to simply move money from one publicly owned "pocket" to another, i.e., from a publicly owned bank's equity capital account to the government coffers. From a political perspective, however, such a transaction may be far from neutral. Using related lending to relax the government's budget constraint may improve a politician's reelection prospects.
If the loan arrangements are nontransparent, then the politician can essentially use the citizens' own money to give the impression of good public governance. Such transactions can thus provide short-run benefits for incumbents, but they may be associated with longer-run costs. For example, such profit transfers can compromise a municipality's future ability to rely on the bank in the case of unforeseen shortfalls.
There may also be a "crowding-out effect": if a bank's related lending erodes the bank's capital and compromises the bank's access to capital markets, then this can negatively affect the bank's lending to the private sector. Such crowding-out can impair the local tax base. An incumbent politician will, however, fail to internalize these longer-run costs if his reelection prospects are low.
We contribute to the related lending literature by showing a connection between the incidence of profit transfers through related lending and the likelihood that a controlling stakeholder will remain in control. A politician with a low reelection probability is more likely to focus on his personal benefit (improved reelection prospects) of government financing from a government-owned bank, and less likely to consider longer-run costs.
1 We thus hypothesize that transfers of governmentowned banks' profits through related lending ("looting") are more likely to occur when politicians are less secure in their reelection prospects. We test this hypothesis using data about unlisted municipally-owned Austrian banks, and we find evidence in support of the hypothesis.
Our contribution to the literature on related lending is made possible by several unique features of our data. First, we can use election data to construct exogenous measures of the probability that a politician serving as a bank's controlling stakeholder will lose control over the bank. Prior studies of related lending focused on situations in which the banks' related borrowers faced the risk of control losses associated with either defaults of the banks or of the borrowers themselves. Default risk is, however, endogenous because it can be affected by the terms of the related lending. We resolve the problem of reverse causality by using an exogenous measure of the probability with which a class of controlling stakeholders (i.e., the politicians) lose control. We thus document a causal effect that is at the heart of any discussion about related lending and "looting".
Second, ours is the only study of related lending that we know of in which default of related borrowers is not of concern (since the borrowers are municipalities).
2 We can therefore rule out certain alternative motivations for the related lending of the banks in our sample, other than such lending being a vehicle for profit transfers. For example, we can rule out that the lending is motivated by the banks knowing more about the creditworthiness of the municipalities than other banks. Finally, our data set includes a number of relatively homogeneous banks in a country with a high rule of law.
3
We employ a research strategy that is based on a natural experiment that occurred when Austria joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. 4 EU regulations imposed new transparency requirements on the municipalities' financing starting in this year. It was possible for politicians to loot municipally owned banks through their municipal borrowing prior to 1995, but not after.
5 By examining changes that occurred at the time of this exogenous event we are able to avoid problems of endogeneity in our analysis.
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We conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of the relation between banks' profitability and their municipal lending before Austria joined the EU and after Austria joined the EU. We find that this relation did change, but only for banks that are owned by politically competitive municipalities. In a politically competitive municipality an incumbent politician faces a lower probability of reelection, i.e., a lower probability that his control over the bank will continue. 7 For banks owned by 2 This is discussed further in the data section of the paper. 3 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) rank countries on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the best score. Mexico has a score of 5.35 and Austria has a score of 10. Russia is not ranked in the study.
4 Meyer (1995) suggests that making use of a "natural experiment" can ameliorate endogeneity problems. The key requirement in a natural experiment is an event, the occurrence of which was independent of the variables of interest, and that caused exogenous changes in the variables of interest. Austria's decision to join the EU was almost certainly made independent of the interests of municipal banks. Once the decision was made the EU rules were taken as given.
5 We discuss in a later section the reasons why it is reasonable to assume that the regulations are effective.
6 Our main concern is that we do not know the true relationship between bank profitability and lending to individual municipalities in the absence of any related lending effects.
7 We consider three different proxies for the political competitiveness of a municipality. For example, one measure defines a municipality to be noncompetitive if the same party won each of the six parliamentary elections prior to 1995, and by a margin of at least 10%. Any municipality that does not satisfy this condition is classified as politically competitive. As discussed in the data section we construct these measures so that they are exogenous to the municipal financing such municipalities profitability relative to the size of their municipal loan portfolios increased significantly after Austria joined the EU. For banks that are owned by politically noncompetitive municipalities, there was no significant difference in the profitability of municipal lending pre-and post-EU.
8
These results are consistent with the theory that politicians who face political competition (are more likely to lose reelection) can benefit from looting their municipally owned banks, while those who are more politically secure cannot. In order to rule out other possible explanations for our results we run a number of robustness checks. For example, we estimate the relation between bank profitability and lending to non-municipal customers both pre-EU and post-EU. In contrast to the above results, we find that this relation became significantly more negative after Austria joined the EU. This latter result can be explained by the increase in competition that Austrian banks faced after EU membership, but it makes our result for municipal lending even more striking.
Our study differs from some of the earlier literature in that we focus on bank profitability relative to related lending, rather than on the volume of related lending.
The volume of related lending did increase after Austria joined the EU for most of the banks in our sample. This increase occurred because of changes in tax rules and transfers between the federal and local governments that affected all Austrian municipalities in 1995.
9 We model these changes and check for any evidence that reelection probabilities affect the volume of related lending. We find no such evidence.
As a further robustness check we replicate our analysis while holding constant the banks' lending quantities to the municipalities (at the levels we observe prior to EU accession). We find that our results are robust.
To the best of our knowledge ours is the first study of related lending that directly examines the role of the probability that the controlling stakeholder relationship will continue. 10 Ours is also the first study of related lending to make use of a natural decisions. 8 We can rule out that our measures of political competition are merely proxies for institutional differences between the municipalities since Austrian municipalities feature identical political institutions and election procedures.
9 When Austria joined the EU, the system of inter-government transfers was reformed in a way that led to municipalities bearing much of the cost of Austria's EU membership.
10 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) report a positive correlation between in-experiment. Our results are most similar to those of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) , Laeven (2001) , and Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) , in that we provide evidence consistent with the looting view of related lending. Lamoreaux (1994) and Maurer and Haber (2007) , in contrast, argue that banks can benefit from related lending, because such lending can mitigate informational asymmetries between banks and their borrowers. 11 Our work differs further from all of the above studies in that we study related lending in a country that has a high rule of law and we examine borrowers and banks that have close to zero default probabilities.
Our work is also related to the literature on government ownership of banks. Government ownership of banks is quite common in many countries around the world.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) analyze a sample of 92 countries and find that, on average, government-owned banks control about 42% of the assets of a country's 10 largest banks. These findings were based on data about the year 1995, but more recent contributions confirm that government ownership of banks remains high.
12 Ours is not the first study to show that politics can affect the lending decisions of government-owned banks. Dinç (2005) finds that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. Sapienza (2004) finds that Italian government-owned banks charge interest rates that vary across regions and decrease in the regional power of the party in control of the bank. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected firms in Pakistan receive more and riskier loans from government-owned banks. Cole (2009) shows that governmentowned bank lending tracks the electoral cycle for a large sample of agricultural loans in India. Interestingly, he also finds that the largest increases in lending volume can be found in areas in which elections are particularly close
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the theory and we describe the natural experiment that is at the core of our empirical analysis. In Section 3 we describe the data and provide some summary statistics. In Section 4 we present the main empirical analysis. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
creases in related lending and the number of nonrelated nonperforming loans in a bank. But, their study only covers a small number of banks and so they are not able to explore this relationship. 11 Maurer and Haber (2007) also analyze data about Mexican banks, but from a much earlier period than in the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) study . 12 See Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2007) and Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) .
The Theory and Research Strategy

The Theory
In our problem the owners of the bank and the borrowers are the same -the municipal citizens. The citizens are not, however, the direct decision makers. The citizens choose a municipal manager, the mayor, who makes the borrowing decisions for the municipality. The mayor also sits on the board of directors for the municipally owned bank. The problem is similar to a corporate governance problem. The mayor is mandated to act in the interests of the citizens, but the citizens cannot observe everything that the mayor does, and the mayor may have his own agenda. In addition, because the citizens are numerous, like the shareholders in a widely held company, the potential payoff to an individual citizen for monitoring is small.
There is one personal agenda item that we expect all politicians share in common -getting reelected. 13 We assume that the politician, P , obtains a benefit B each time that he is reelected. P can affect his probability of being reelected in each period by exerting effort and/or by transferring profits from the bank to the municipal coffers (looting the bank). Neither of these actions are directly observed by voters. The latter action has the effect of giving the appearance that the town has been well run during that period. Doing so may thus improve P 's reelection prospects. If P chooses not to loot the bank, then the bank's profits can be saved in what is essentially a "rainy day fund" for the town. We assume that in any period there is a probability γ (0 < γ < 1) that the town is hit by a random shock. The nature of this shock is such that if there is no rainy day fund (because of previous looting), then the voters will suffer, either in the form of diminished town services or higher taxes.
We assume that if this happens, then the incumbent is certain to lose reelection.
Our objective in this section is to understand the linkage between P 's reelection probability and P 's looting decision. We thus consider only the looting decision and we assume a two period model. If P does not loot the bank in a given period, then his reelection probability in that period is equal to the prior, p 0 (0 < p 0 < 1). P can increase his reelection probability in the current period by looting the bank.
Specifically we assume that the probability of reelection, if P loots and if the town does not experience a random shock is:
We assume a discount factor of one, so P 's expected payoff is the sum of the probability-weighted benefits over the two years. P 's expected payoff if he does not loot in the first period is:
If P loots the bank in the first period and the town is hit by a random shock in the second period, then P will lose reelection for certain in the second period. This event occurs with probability γ, and is distributed independently of the election outcome in the absence of such a shock. P 's expected payoff if he does loot in the first period is thus:
We can define P 's relative net expected benefit from looting as:
The first term in equation (1) is the benefit to looting; the second term is the cost.
The benefit is due to the increased reelection probability in the short run. The cost is due to the possibility that the money that has been transferred out of the bank today may be needed in the future. Figure 1 illustrates the relation between P 's net benefit from looting the municipal bank and P 's prior reelection probability, p 0 . Looting is beneficial to P for low and intermediate values of p 0 ; for high values of p 0 the cost outweighs the benefit, and so P will not want to loot the bank. Figure 1 shows this relation for the value γ Our model is similar to the models of Laeven (2001) and La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Zamarripa (2003) in that we assume there is a controlling stakeholder in the bank who can compel the bank manager to approve a loan that is suboptimal for the bank. The model is also similar in that our controlling stakeholder faces a tradeoff when deciding whether to loot the bank. Our model differs from those of Laeven (2001) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) in that we do not consider default, either of the borrower (municipality) or the bank. Our stakeholder does not consider the possibility of effectively stealing from other stakeholders in the case of default. The benefit/cost tradeoff in our model is between a certain increase in the current reelection probability versus a possible large decrease in the future reelection probability. The prediction of our model is that a politician with a higher prior reelection probability faces a smaller benefit and a larger cost to looting, and so is less likely to loot his municipally-owned bank.
The Natural Experiment
Profitability may vary across our banks for reasons that have nothing to do with related lending. Studies such as ours are often plagued by endogeneity problems in that it is impossible to ascertain what the banks' profitability levels would have been in any given year if looting had not been possible. We avoid this endogeneity problem by making use of a "natural experiment". A key requirement of a natural experiment is an event, the occurrence of which was independent of the variables of interest, and that caused exogenous changes in the variables of interest. By examining these changes we can analyze the relation between profitability and related lending, while avoiding the problem of endogeneity. As described by Meyer (1995) , the relevant exogenous event in economic studies is often a change in regulations.
Austria joined the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1995. As of this date Austrian municipalities were required to start obeying EU Directive 92/50EEC concerning public procurement. This directive specifies explicit rules for the public procurement of a range of services, including banking and investment services. The municipalities had to start following "open procedures [...] whereby all interested service providers may submit a tender" (Article I(d)), invite sufficiently many bidders to "ensure genuine competition" (Article 13), and base the award of contracts on "the lowest price only" (Article 36). The directives also increased the transparency of municipal borrowing. Upon request, the municipalities have to report to competing bidders and the European Commission "the name of the successful tenderer and the reason why this tenderer was selected" (Article 12). These rules apply whenever the municipalities borrow more than about 1.5 million Euros. Prior to joining the EU Austrian municipalities were not required to follow such transparent procedures.
It is possible that the EU rule, because it requires municipalities to solicit a number of bids and to accept the best bid, led to a decrease in the profitability of municipal banks' lending to their municipalities. However, by stipulating an increase in transparency, the rules would have also made it harder for municipalities to borrow from their own banks at below-market interest rates. If a municipality was "looting" its bank in this way, then we expect that the profitability of the bank's municipal lending would have increased after Austria's EU accession. We thus look at the change in the profitability of the banks' related lending after Austria joined the EU. 17 We also look at the difference in this change between banks that are owned by municipalities with a high level of political competition (p 0 close to .5) and those owned by municipalities with a low level of political competition (p 0 much higher than .5 for the incumbent).
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Financial data about the banks and municipalities
Our empirical analysis is based on bank-level data about municipally-owned savings banks spanning the decade 1990-1999 (i.e., symmetric around the event date of the natural experiment in January 1995). To be included in our sample a bank must fulfill the following criteria: (i) the bank was active, as an independent bank, for at least 3 years before and after Austria's EU accession, and (ii) the bank was owned by a municipality during the sample period. Fifty-three municipally-owned Austrian savings banks satisfy these criteria and are included in our sample.
We obtained most of our bank-level data from the "Sparkassen-Pruefungsverband".
This institution is under the direct supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance, and is charged with the financial supervision of savings banks. We obtained additional data from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB). This data was used to validate and cross-check our original data from the "Sparkassen-Pruefungsverband".
The data include the banks' annual balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, as well as information about the compositions of the banks' loan portfolios. The latter information, which is typically not included in balance sheets, enables us to determine the volume of banks' lending to municipalities. 18 We collected financial information about the municipalities from Statistik Austria. 19 This data includes 17 Both the event (joining the EU) and the rule change are exogenous to the variables of interest. Austria's decision to join the EU was based on a popular vote that was taken in June 1994. It is very unlikely that the rule change affecting the municipal banks was a determining factor in the vote. It was also not at all clear ex-ante whether the vote would be in favor of joining, so the municipalities could not anticipate the rule changes.
18 It was not possible to obtain data about the terms of the loans. We focus instead on bank performance. Since the banks do not have publicly traded equity, we use accounting data to measure performance.
19 http://www.statistik.at/web the amount of debt of each municipality per capita, the regional Gross Domestic
Product per capita and growth of the regional GDP.
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For each bank we have between 3 and 5 observations pre- EU (1990 EU ( to 1994 are reported in Euros in order to make the information more accessible to readers.
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We divide the banks' loan portfolios into loans to municipalities and all other loans.
LM is the ratio of municipal loans to total assets. LnoM is the ratio of the remaining loan portfolio to total assets. These ratios do not sum up to one because the total assets include nonloan assets, such as investments in traded securities.
The banks in our sample were generally profitable and had total assets ranging from about 32 million Euros to about 4.45 billion Euros. The mean size of the banks is somewhat larger in the post-EU period, but there is no significant difference in the mean profitability of the banks in the two periods. The fraction of the banks' assets invested in loans to municipalities (LM ) did increase significantly after Austria joined the EU, from 3.7% during the pre-EU period to 17.3% in the post-EU period.
In the pre-EU period four of the banks in our sample had no loans to municipalities, and the largest value for LM was 14.8%. In the post-EU period only three banks had no loans to municipalities and the largest value for LM was 30.6%. We believe that this increase is explained largely by factors that are exogenous to our study. When
Austria joined the EU, the system of inter-governmental transfers was reformed in a way that caused municipalities to bear much of the cost of Austria's EU membership.
Changes in tax laws and in transfers between the federal and local governments 20 GDP data is available only on a regional level that is somewhat coarser than the municipal level. While our main data set consists of 53 banks and municipalities, the regional GDP data is available for 24 regions.
21 Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) we don't use annual observations but preand post-EU median values in our empirical analysis.
22 Observations below the 1%ile and above the 99%ile are replaced by the percentiles, in order to eliminate outliers. The winsorizing occurred prior to calculating the medians.
23 The data is given in Austrian Schillings (ATS). When producing the numbers in Table 1 we used the exchange rate: 1 Euro = 13.76 ATS.
occurred at this time and affected all Austrian municipalities. The ratio of nonmunicipal loans to total assets, LnoM , did not change significantly after Austria joined the EU, so the increase in LM is accompanied by a relative decrease in nonloan assets. Consistent with the post-EU increase in LM we also see that the municipal debt per capita, DC, increased after Austria joined the EU, although not in the same magnitude as the increase in LM . The GDP per capita did increase from the pre-EU period to the post-EU period, as we would expect. 24 We explore these changes further in a later section where we analyze the increases in LM to determine if there are cross-sectional differences that are relevant for our study. Table 3 presents correlations between the variables that are summarized in Table   1 . Bank size is negatively correlated with LM , as is post-EU GDP growth. Bank size is positively correlated with GDP per capita and with municipal debt per capita.
LM is not significantly correlated with the return on assets. LnoM is negatively correlated with the return on assets in the post-EU period. This may be due to increased competition after Austria joined the EU.
Data about political competition
To construct measures of political competition we use municipal-level data about the outcomes of elections for representatives in the Austrian national assembly. From the Statistik Austria website we have obtained the number of votes that voters in each municipality cast in favor of each major party in the national elections that took place in 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990 and 1994 . This data enables us to determine if a municipality has strongly favored one party over all others.
25
We use these data to construct three indicators of politically competitive municipalities. Each of these indicators takes the value one if the municipality is politically competitive and zero otherwise. For the first measure a municipality is defined as 24 The GDP per capita in our municipalities is somewhat lower than for Austria on average. For example, the per capita GDP for Austria in 1997 was 23,000 Euros. The reason for this difference is that our data set includes banks in a number of rural regions and it does not include any banks in the largest Austrian cities. Vienna, Graz, Linz and Salzburg are not represented in our sample.
25 There does not exist any central storage of data about elections for Austrian municipal offices. Even if such data could be obtained, it would not be useful for constructing exogenous measures of political competition. We use only pre-1995 data to further ensure that our measures are exogeneous.
noncompetitive (P ol1 = 0) if the same party won each of the six elections, and by a margin of at least 10%; otherwise P ol1 = 1. According to this measure 28 of the municipalities are identified as politically competitive and 25 as noncompetitive.
For the second measure a municipality is defined as noncompetitive (P ol2 = 0) if one party obtained, on average across the six elections, at least 50% of the votes; otherwise P ol2 = 1.
26 According to our second measure 27 of the municipalities are identified as politically competitive and 26 as noncompetitive.
The third indicator variable is based on the "victory margin" of the locally leading party. The locally leading party is the party that won the largest number of elections. In the case of a tie, the locally leading party is the party that on average won with the largest fraction. The victory margin of the leading party is the average winning margin for that party across the six elections. 27 We then calculate the median victory margin across the 53 municipalities. As indicated in Table 2 , this median value is 13.4%. Municipalities with a victory margin below the median value are identified as "politically competitive" and are assigned a value of P ol3 = 1. Municipalities with a victory margin at or above the median are noncompetitive and are assigned a value of P ol3 = 0. According to this indicator, 26 of the municipalities are identified as politically competitive and 27 as noncompetitive.
Our three measures of political competition result in similar classifications of the municipalities.
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4 The Empirical Analysis
Related Lending and Bank Profitability: Pre-versus Post-EU
We conduct our empirical analysis in two parts. We begin by examining "first differences": the difference in bank profitability relative to related lending before and 26 There are more than two parties, so a party may win with less than 50% of the vote. 27 The winning margin is the percent of votes won by the locally leading parting minus the percent of votes won by the second place party. The margin is positive for any election which the leading party won and negative if the party lost.
28 Every municipality that is classified to be politically-competitive according to measure P ol3 is also classified as being competitive according to the other two measures. Similarly, the politicallycompetitive municipalities according to P ol2 are also politically-competitive according to P ol1.
after Austria joined the EU. This part of the analysis enables us to determine if related lending did become, on average, more profitable for the municipally-owned banks after EU accession. We then proceed to a "differences-in-differences" analysis.
In this second step of the analysis we examine the difference in the first differences (pre-vs. post-EU) between banks that are owned by politically competitive municipalities and those owned by politically noncompetitive municipalities. In this section we present the analysis using first differences.
As discussed, EU transparency rules made it very difficult for municipalities to borrow from their own banks at non-market terms. If municipalities were borrowing from their banks at below-market terms (looting the banks) prior to EU accession, then the bank profitability relative to such related lending should improve after EU accession. We check for evidence of such improvement by running the following regression:
where RoA i,t denotes the return-on-assets of bank i in period t, LM i,t is the volume of bank i's municipal lending divided by the bank's total assets, E t is a dummy variable that equals zero (one) during the period before (after) Austria joined the EU, X i,t is a vector of control variables, u i are bank-specific fixed effects, and i,t is an error term. This initial regression does not include our political variables. The coefficient a E LM , measures the difference in the correlation between bank profitability and municipal lending before and after Austria's EU accession.
29 This coefficient should be positive if municipalities were using related lending to loot their banks in the pre-EU period, and not in the post-EU period.
The estimates of regression (2) are presented in column D 1 of Table 4 . Rather than working with annual observations, we run the regression using pre-and post-
EU median values of all variables. 30 There are 53 banks and two observations for each bank, a pre-EU median and a post-EU median. The control variables in the regressions are the log of total assets in Austrian Schillings (log(T A)), 31 the ratio of non-municipal loans to bank assets (LnoM ), the municipal debt per capita (DC), the regional GDP per capita (GDP C), and the regional GDP growth (GDP Gr).
The coefficient a LM is significantly negative and the coefficient a E LM is significantly positive. Related lending appears to have become more profitable after Austria joined the EU. These results are consistent with the looting explanation of related lending.
In Column D 2 of Table 4 we confirm that the banks' municipal loans are indeed different from their non-municipal loans. We re-estimate regression equation (2), but with a slightly different specification: we substitute the interacted variable
In column D 2 we see that the coefficient on LnoM i,t E t is significantly negative. This negative coefficient is consistent with an increase in bank competition that occurred after Austria joined the EU. It is thus quite striking that the coefficient on LM i,t E t , in column D 1 , is significantly positive.
Politics and Related Lending: Differences-in-Differences
We now proceed to examine the effect of politics on the difference documented in the previous section. To identify the political effect, we use a difference-in-difference specification. This specification captures the idea that different banks may have realized different levels of change in the profitability of their related lending. More specifically, we test the hypothesis put forth in Section 2 that politicians with lower probabilities of reelection are more likely to loot their banks. This hypothesis leads directly to the prediction that banks that are owned by municipalities with more competitive politics should have realized greater improvements in the profitability of their related lending.
We use the political competition variables that are summarized in Table 2 to divide the municipal banks into two groups. Those municipalities with competitive political environments (low reelection probability) are assigned a value of P ol i = 1; those municipalities with less competitive political environments (high reelection probability) are assigned a value of P ol i = 0. The following regression equation is identical to that in expression (2), except for the middle line:
The coefficient a E P,LM captures the difference-in-difference effect, i.e., the differential effect of EU membership on related lending for banks owned by politically competitive and politically noncompetitive municipalities. According to our hypothesis, this coefficient should be positive.
The estimates for equation (3) are presented in Table 5 . All of the regressions in this table are GLS regressions with bank-specific random effects.
32 As in Table   4 , there are 53 banks and two observations for each bank, a pre-EU median and a post-EU median. The control variables are also the same as in Table 4 . Table   5 presents three different estimates of equation (3), one with each of the political variables that are summarized in Table 2 .
The results of estimating equation (3) are quite striking. The coefficient a E P,LM is significantly positive, as predicted, and the coefficient a E LM is now insignificant. The effect that we documented in the analysis of first differences of the previous section occurs only for those banks that are owned by politically competitive municipalities. That is, we find evidence consistent with municipalities using related lending to transfer profits out of their banks only for municipalities in which there is a competitive political environment. For those municipalities in which the incumbent party faces a high reelection probability we find no such evidence.
To gauge the economic importance of these results, consider a government-owned bank that has an average amount of lending to municipalities and that is located in a politically competitive municipality. Such a bank would have, on average across the sample period, municipal loans equal to about 10.5% of assets.
33 Compared to banks in politically non-competitive municipalities, this bank's return on assets was 32 We use random, instead of fixed, effects because the political variables do not vary over time and so their effects cannot be estimated in a fixed effects framework.
33 Table 1 shows that the mean level of lending to municipalities normalized by total assets is 3.7% (17.3%) pre-Eu (post-EU). The average of these is 10.5%. In the following section we show that the level of municipal lending does not vary with our political variables.
lower by approximately 0.5% (0.105*0.045).
34 The event of Austria joining the EU increased this bank's median return on assets in the 5 years post-EU by approximately 1% (0.173*0.059), an amount that more than offsets the unconditionally negative effect. Based on the mean bank size, as reported in Table 1, this translates to about 4.6 million Euros per bank in the post-EU period.
Table 5 also shows that banks in politically competitive municipalities underperformed by 0.6% on average. This is a notable amount and in order to examine the effect of politics alone, we estimated a specification similar to equation (3), but without any of the terms containing LM i,t . We found in the new specification that the political variables, without related lending, have much weaker explanatory power for bank profitability.
35 That is, political competition seems to affect the profitability of these government-owned banks predominantly through their related lending.
As we did in Section 4.1, we again check that municipal loans are different from all other loans. To do this we perform a robustness check that is similar to that presented in Column D 2 of Table 4 . We re-estimate regression equation (3), but with the following change: for all of the interacted variables containing LM i,t
we substitute the equivalent interacted variable containing LnoM i,t instead. These estimates are reported in Table 6 . As in Column D 2 of Table 4 , we find that loans to municipalities are different from loans to other entities. Not only is the coefficient on LnoM i,t E t negative and significant in two of the three columns, but none of the coefficients for political variables are significant. It is only the volume of lending to municipalities (the related lending) that results in a pattern that is consistent with our hypothesis.
Volume of municipal lending
We have in the previous section documented a relation between reelection probabilities (political competition) and the profitability of related lending. We now check for any relation between political competition and the volume of related lending.
We have already shown (in Table 1 ) that the volume of lending to municipalities in-creased significantly from the pre-EU to the post-EU period. This increase occurred for all but three banks in our sample. We have learned that this increase followed from changes in tax rules and transfers between the federal and local governments that affected all Austrian municipalities when Austria joined the EU. In order to check if there are cross-sectional differences in these increases that are related to political competition we run the following regression:
where all of the variables are as defined before, and the control variables X i,t are the same as in the previous regressions.
The estimates for equation (4) are presented in Table 7 . All of the regressions in this table are GLS regressions with bank-specific random effects. As in Table 5 , the three columns represent three different estimates of equation (4), one with each of the political variables that are summarized in Table 2 . In each of these three columns we see that b E is significantly positive. This result is consistent with Table 1 where we showed a significant increase in LM post-EU. Neither b P nor b E P is significantly different from zero in any of the columns of Table 7 . Political competition does not explain the changes in the volume of related lending.
Robustness checks
We have documented in the previous section that there is no significant relation between the degree of political competition in the municipalities that own the banks in our sample, and the volume of the banks' lending to their owners. There however remains the question whether our previous results regarding bank profitability depend on the increase in the volume of the banks' lending to their owners after Austria's EU accession. To answer the latter question, we conduct a robustness check in which we hold constant the banks' lending to their owners at pre-EU levels.
I.e., we estimate our regressions as if there was no change in the level of each bank's related lending. Table 8 summarizes the results for the first differences specification (column 1) and the differences-in-differences specification with different proxies for political competition (column 2 to 4). Our prior results regarding bank profitability turn out to be robust: lending to politically competitive municipalities became more profitable for these municipalities' banks after Austria joined the EU, but there was no similar effect in politically uncompetitive municipalities. This robustness check alleviates concerns that our prior estimates were biased due to endogeneity of the variable LM .
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the understanding of related lending by demonstrating the importance of the likelihood that a related borrower's position of control with respect to the bank will endure. Using a unique data set about municipally-owned banks we find evidence consistent with the "looting" explanation of related lending. That is, we find evidence of municipalities borrowing from their own banks at below-market terms, and thus using related lending to transfer profits out of the banks. We hypothesize that such transfers should be more beneficial for politicians who are not confident in their reelection prospects (have a low probability of remaining in control), and less beneficial (potentially costly) for politicians who have high reelection probabilities. We formulate exogenous measures of the reelection probabilities and find strong evidence for the hypothesis. In particular, we find evidence consistent with government borrowers using related lending to transfer profits out of their banks, but only for municipalities in which there is a competitive political environment. For those municipalities in which the incumbent party faces a high reelection probability we find no such evidence. Table 2 : Summary statistics of political variables All of the political variables (P ol) were created using data from six elections for local representatives to the national government. The six elections took place before 1995 (1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990 and 1994) . Victory Margin (V M ) is the average across the six elections of the percent of votes won by the locally leading party (i.e., the party that won most of the 6 elections) minus the percent of votes won by the second place party (in individual years this victory margin can be negative). Competitive (P ol1) is equal to zero if the same party won each of the six elections, and by a margin of at least 10%; otherwise P ol1 is equal to one. Non-Dominant winner (P ol2) is equal to zero if one party obtained, on average across the six elections, at least 50% of the votes; otherwise P ol2 is equal to zero. P ol3 is equal to zero if the election differencei.e., the average across the six elections of the percent of votes won by the top party minus the percent of votes won by the second place party -is above the median of all municipalities in the sample; otherwise P ol3 is equal to one. A value of one (zero) for any political variable indicates a high (low) level of political competition. Table 5 : Politics and Related Lending (Differences-in-Differences Results). GLS regressions with bank specific random effects. The dependent variable is return on assets, RoA. T A is total assets. The post-EU variable is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. We use three variables to identify politically competitive municipalities: P ol1, P ol2 and P ol3 are defined in detail in Table 2 Table 6 : Politics and Lending to Other Clients (i.e., not municipalities): Differences-in-Differences Results. GLS regressions with bank specific random effects. The dependent variable is return on assets, RoA. T A is total assets. The post-EU variable is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. We use three variables to identify politically competitive municipalities: P ol1, P ol2 and P ol3 are defined in detail in Table 2 . For each bank there is one observation pre-EU and one observation post-EU. z statistics are given in parentheses. dependent variable = RoA P ol1 P ol2 P ol3 Log(T A) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** Table 7 : Lending to Municipalities: GLS regressions with bank specific random effects. The dependent variable is lending to municipality, LM . T A is total assets. The post-EU variable is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. We use three variables to identify politically competitive municipalities: P ol1, P ol2 and P ol3 are defined in detail in Table 2 Table 8 : Robustness Test. Fixed effects and GLS regressions with bank specific random effects. The dependent variable is return on assets, RoA. T A is total assets. The post-EU variable is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. For each bank, we replace its post-EU level of LM by its pre-EU level in these specifications; i.e., pre-EU LM varies across banks but is constant across time. We use three variables to identify politically competitive municipalities: P ol1, P ol2 and P ol3 are defined in detail in Table 2 
